In June, BYD — the world's largest electric-vehicle maker — posted a short message on a Chinese messaging app promising to pay its suppliers within 60 days. The pledge sounded routine. It was anything but. For nearly a decade, BYD had financed its rise from obscure electronics-parts maker to Tesla's biggest rival in part by paying suppliers with promissory notes — essentially IOUs — through an in-house platform called Di Lian. Now Beijing was forcing the company to stop, and tens of thousands of suppliers and investors were treating the announcement as a watershed moment.
The results have been dramatic. According to BYD's most recent annual report, the company's total borrowings jumped to Rmb115.4bn ($16.6bn), up from Rmb28.5bn the year before. First-quarter results showed short-term borrowings climbing another 72% to Rmb66bn by the end of March. BYD's chief executive of overseas expansion, Stella Li, told the Financial Times that the IOU system had become an 'industry standard' but that the company was now resolving the issue. The shift, she acknowledged, reflected a restructuring of liabilities rather than a deeper change in the business.
Here's the catch. For years, BYD's interest-free supplier financing did more than smooth payments — it freed cash for aggressive R&D and overseas expansion. A Chinese technology expert at Beijing research group Gavekal noted that long payment cycles are common in China's auto industry, but BYD's terms were 'particularly aggressive,' with Chinese media reporting that some 10,000 suppliers were waiting more than 300 days to be paid. Now, with Beijing pressuring BYD to pay faster, that hidden subsidy is disappearing. Operating cash flow fell from Rmb133.4bn in 2024 to Rmb59.1bn last year, then to just Rmb2.8bn at the end of March.
Why is Beijing acting now? The crackdown is part of President Xi Jinping's 'fan neijuan,' or anti-involution, campaign — a policy aimed at the risks of destructive industrial overcompetition. BYD's payment system, analysts argue, had become an extreme example: a powerful firm using its leverage to push financial strain down its supply chain. Smaller suppliers reportedly had almost a year of receivables tied up, stretching their end-to-end cash collection cycle past 300 days.
BYD insists concerns over its liabilities are 'unwarranted,' and some analysts agree the company can still raise formal financing at low rates. But independent researchers paint a starker picture. According to GMT Research, a Hong Kong accounting firm that has tracked BYD for years, the company's headline net debt of Rmb22bn obscured the true scale: closer to Rmb320bn once 'de-recognised receivables' and 'excess payables beyond 90 days' were counted. Data from Wind, a Chinese financial-data provider, showed BYD's payment cycle had recently shortened to about 123 days — four days closer to Beijing's 60-day target, but still far above it. Meanwhile, the company is pressing forward globally: building factories in Hungary, Brazil, Indonesia, Thailand, Turkey and Uzbekistan, and launching its own fleet of eight ships to carry its cars overseas. The IOU era is ending, but BYD's ambitions — and its debt — are only growing.
The world's biggest electric-car maker quietly financed its rise by paying suppliers in IOUs. Then Beijing said: stop. Now BYD's debt is exploding — and the bill is due.
In June, Chinese EV giant BYD posted a short message on WeChat promising to pay its suppliers within 60 days. That sounds boring — but it ended a system that had quietly bankrolled BYD's rise from obscure battery maker to Tesla's biggest rival.
For years, BYD paid parts makers with promissory notes — essentially IOUs — through an in-house platform called Di Lian. Beijing has now cracked down on that practice as part of its 'anti-involution' campaign, forcing BYD to swap free supplier credit for actual bank loans. Short-term borrowings jumped 72% in a single quarter to roughly Rmb66bn ($9.2bn).
BYD wasn't just selling cars. It was also running a giant, unofficial bank — borrowing from its own suppliers at 0% interest. Take that bank away and the real cost of growth shows up on the balance sheet.
Every EV in your driveway-of-the-future scenario — whether it's a BYD, Tesla, or a brand that doesn't exist yet — depends on this exact competitive battle. China's price war is reshaping which carmakers survive, which countries dominate green tech, and how cheap your first car might be. If you're considering a career in engineering, supply-chain management, or finance, this is the kind of accounting story that explains why companies that look unstoppable suddenly aren't.
BYD is now launching an eight-ship overseas export fleet and building factories in Hungary, Brazil, Indonesia, Thailand, Turkey and Uzbekistan — a global expansion funded, in part, by the very supplier squeeze Beijing is now ending. Watch for two second-order effects: smaller Chinese suppliers, many of which had over 300 days of receivables tied up with BYD, may finally get paid (or go bust waiting); and rivals like Xiaomi and Geely face the same anti-involution rules, meaning China's whole EV sector is about to look financially weaker — and possibly more rational — at exactly the moment it's trying to conquer global markets.