In mid-March, French President Emmanuel Macron stood at Penly, a windswept site on the Normandy coast, and announced the start of a new generation of nuclear reactors due to begin producing electricity in 2038. He called atomic energy 'the work of the century' — a phrase that sounded equal parts inspiring and ominous. Inspiring, because France is betting that nuclear power can decarbonise its economy and free Europe from imported Russian gas. Ominous, because the company tasked with delivering this miracle, the state-controlled utility EDF, is widely accused of being inward-looking, bureaucratic and politicised.
EDF's engineering reputation is genuine. Few firms anywhere match its expertise in designing and operating large reactors, and France's existing fleet of 56 reactors — built in a remarkable 15-year burst during the 1970s and 1980s — remains the backbone of European low-carbon power. But the company that pulled off that postwar feat looks very different today. Critics quoted in the press describe EDF as a 'state within a state,' a sprawling organisation that has absorbed political loyalties along with engineering know-how. Decisions that once moved quickly now wind through committees, ministries and presidential offices.
The warning signs are concrete. EDF's flagship next-generation reactor, Flamanville 3 in Normandy, came online roughly 12 years behind schedule and billions of euros over budget. Across the Channel, its Hinkley Point C project in Somerset — Britain's first new nuclear plant in a generation — has suffered its own cost overruns, shaking confidence among investors and foreign governments. These are not safety failures or technical breakdowns; they are paperwork failures, supply-chain failures and management failures. The physics works. The bureaucracy, allegedly, does not.
Into this mess walks Bernard Fontana, EDF's new chief executive. Fontana replaced Luc Rémont, who was pushed out after clashing with the French government over EDF's direction — a reminder that in a state-owned company, the real boardroom sits in the presidential palace. Fontana's task is daunting: build at least six new EPR2 reactors, each producing 1.6 gigawatts, at roughly the pace of one per year. He must also rebuild a domestic supply chain, recruit thousands of welders and engineers, and finish Hinkley Point C without another embarrassing blowout. The first new French reactor is not expected to generate power until 2038, fifteen years away.
Here's the catch. The world isn't waiting for France. South Korea's KHNP recently beat EDF to a major Czech reactor contract, and American start-ups are racing to commercialise small modular reactors that could undercut the giant EPR2 design on cost and flexibility. Meanwhile, Europe's appetite for sovereign, low-carbon energy has never been larger; data centres for artificial intelligence alone could swallow vast new tranches of electricity. If EDF delivers, France becomes the indispensable power of European energy security. If it stumbles, the nuclear revival passes to Seoul, Washington or Beijing — and Macron's 'work of the century' becomes a cautionary tale about what happens when a national champion forgets how to move fast.
France wants to lead Europe's nuclear comeback with six giant new reactors — but its state-owned champion EDF is so bloated and political that critics call it 'a state within a state.'
In mid-March, President Emmanuel Macron visited the Penly site in Normandy to mark the start of a new generation of French reactors, due to start producing electricity from 2038. Macron called atomic energy 'the work of the century' and pledged to do it for the country's children.
But EDF, the state-owned utility tasked with the build, is in trouble. The article reports that under new CEO Bernard Fontana, EDF must deliver six 1.6GW EPR2 reactors at home while also keeping the UK's Hinkley Point C project alive — all while critics say the company has grown inward-looking, politicised and tangled in red tape.
Think of EDF less like a normal company and more like a national institution that happens to sell electricity — closer to a public works ministry than to a competitive business.
If you're a teen in Europe, the electricity that charges your phone, heats your school and powers the AI tools you use is increasingly tied to bets being made right now on nuclear. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine sent gas prices soaring, governments rediscovered nuclear as a climate-friendly, sovereign source of power. Whether EDF can actually build these reactors on time and on budget will shape European energy bills, climate targets and tech competitiveness for the next 30 years.
France built 56 reactors in roughly 15 years during the 1970s and '80s — a feat the article suggests today's EDF couldn't repeat. Watch for three things: whether Hinkley Point C finishes without another blowout, whether EDF can recruit the welders and engineers it needs (the industry warns of a skills cliff), and whether rivals like South Korea's KHNP or US-backed small modular reactors steal contracts Europe assumed were France's by right.